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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2002 20:38:40 -0000
To: agathiyar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Article on Sri Lanka by Colonel Athale (retd.)
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http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/22lanka.htm
The Rediff Special/ Colonel Anil A Athale (retd)
Sri Lanka -- war without end, peace without hope!
Most analysts accept that the roots of Tamil
insurgency are
to be found in the rise of Buddhist revival that took
place
during the celebrations of the 2,500th
Mahaparinirvana or death
anniversary of Buddha in 1956. This is not to assert
that Buddhist revivalism
is a recent phenomenon. The revivalist movement was a
part of the
anti-colonial struggle.
The kind of national struggle that arose in India
never took place in Sri
Lanka. The British often described it as a 'model'
colonial territory. The
Buddhist revival had much to do with the activities
of Christian and Muslim
missionaries and was initially directed against them.
The Buddhist revival
was also a part of the search for roots and identity
and to build a nation
state in the European mould.
The social component of the Buddhist revival borrowed
heavily from
Gandhiji's concept of Sarvodaya. Unfortunately, along
with this also arose
the concepts of Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala
people only, Aryan in
race, Buddhist in religion and Sri Lanka as the
Dhamma Dwipa -- a land to
protect Buddhism, much on the lines of Pakistan. As
the majority of the
Sinhalese developed the concept of 'chosen race' , on
the lines of Semites,
Tamil separatism grew in response. By adding the
twist of Dhamma Dwipa,
the Sinhala nationalism easily identified India as
the adversary -- a land
where Buddhism had vanished. The Aryan race, shared
by Indians other
than Tamils, produced a curious effect of 'selective
anti Indianism'. The full
brunt of this was borne by the Tamils who in
desperation had no choice but
to take to violent struggle.
A conflictual situation is complicated when on both
the sides of the divide
there is a strong sense of legitimacy. The Sinhala
regard Sri Lanka as
Dhamma Dwipa and Dhamma Shasan ordained by the divine
Buddha
himself. It is the central purpose for which the
state of Sri Lanka exists. The
perception is sanctified by the 'visit' of Buddha to
Sri Lanka, the presence of
his relics and the Bodhi tree itself. The whole
exercise in establishing
'independence' from the Buddhist roots in India was
initiated in the fifth
century AD as the decline of Buddhism in India began.
Thus many of the
myths infused in Buddhism in Sri Lanka has this
strong purpose of
'preservation' and an unspoken sense of insecurity.
The Sinhalas reject the history of Sri Lanka prior to
the arrival of Sri Vijaya
in 600 BC and have been helped on in this direction
by the Indian Marxist
historians who question the authenticity of the
Ramayan and locate the
Lanka of Ravana in some small village in UP. The
orthodox Buddhists and
modern Marxists agree on this score.
The Tamils, according to the Sinhala version, came
with the invading armies
of Chola kings and established themselves in Jaffna.
The ruins the of Sinhala
civilisation, specially the amazing irrigation works,
was the result of the
invasions from the North and from India. Now that Sri
Lanka is
independent, the North must be liberated and
integrated with the rest of the
country.
The Tamils of Jaffna predate the Sinhalas. Their
civilisation is traceable back
to the Mohenjodaro-Harrapa days of 3,500 BC. Tamils
in Sri Lanka
consider themselves the last of the pure Dravidians
with Saivite Hinduism as
their religion. There are enough ruins and legends
associated with the
Ramayan days to show the existence of the Dravidian
kingdom of Jaffna in
1500 BC.
The Tamils fear that the Sinhalese want to wipe them
out from Sri Lanka or
reduce them to second class citizens. The present
struggle between the
Tamils and the Sinhalas is a repeat of the history of
nearly 400 years of
constant warfare that led to the ruin of Sri Lanka.
In place of the Kingdom
of the Chola or Pandyas, there is today the state of
the Indian Union, in
place of the erstwhile kings of Kandy, we have the
president/prime minister
of Sri Lanka.
Two primordial emotions -- Tamil insecurity and
Sinhala sense of grievance
-- thus fuel the conflict in Sri Lanka. Thus while
the Tamils' actions seem
aggressive, they are in effect defensive. It is worth
noting that except for a
sneak attack once in while, the LTTE has confined its
actions to the North
and Eastern provinces. The LTTE is thus only using
offensive tactics while it
is on a strategic defensive. The Sinhalas are on
strategic offensive and
believe that they have a right to rule the whole
island. The struggle is thus
also about power sharing.
Wider implications
Geography dictates that any conflict in the countries
of the Indian
subcontinent affects India as she is at the centre
and her borders touch each
and every country. Common borders, race, religion and
history make India
and Sri Lanka one of the closest neighbors in the
region with the possible
exception of Nepal. But mere cultural similarities or
even common religion
or race do not necessarily lead to peaceful
relations. Sino-Japanese ties or
relations between a dozen-odd middle eastern
countries prove this
assertion.
Sri Lanka is a plural society and a multi-ethnic
country. Like the other
developing countries, the process of economic
development as well as
nation building, on since 1945 all over the Third
World, has often led to
clashes between various groups within the nation.
India has experienced this
and so has Sri Lanka. In the late nineteenth century,
conflicts took place
mainly between the Buddhists and the Catholics and
the Muslims. The most
serious riots against the Catholics took place in
1883 and 1903. Major
anti-Muslim riots took place in 1915. But since 1958,
the focus of Sinhala
violence has shifted to the Tamils. Major anti-Tamil
riots took place in
1958, 1977 and 1981-'83. This antagonism has led to a
feeling of insecurity
among the Tamils and the movement for Tamil Eelam or
homeland, was
born out of this cauldron of hate.
The Tamil-speaking people of the Indian state of
Tamil Nadu have historical
and blood relations with the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
They could not remain
inactive and watch the genocidal tactics of the Sri
Lankan army against their
own brethren. The rise of Dravidian parties like the
Dravid Kazhagam and
later of its two offshoots, the DMK and the AIADMK
ensured a
competitive backing for the rights of the Sri Lankan
Tamils. The late MGR
went a step further and linked the Tamil survival
with Indian nationalism.
Indian support to the Tamil militants was good
politics, both regionally as
well as nationally. This brought the Indian State in
direct confrontation with
Sinhala nationalism. Being a militarily stronger
power, India intervened in Sri
Lanka in 1987, initially with the sole aim of saving
the Tamils. That
subsequently it ended up fighting the Tamils
themselves can be only
understood to be the result of the naivete of top
Indian leaders, of the
bungling of an egotist diplomat and the shrewdness of
President
Jayawardene.
The IPKF saga
Intervention in the affairs of Sri Lanka from South
India dates back to
ancient times. The Sinhalese played one side against
the other (the Cholas
against the Pandyas) and survived. This is much more
difficult in the case of
a united India. It is still true that under the
Indian federal system and a
multi-party democracy, the Sri Lankans did play this
game successfully by
pitting the Tamil Nadu government against the central
government and the
DMK, an ally of the National Front against the
Congress party.
Indian military intervention in the Sri Lankan
conflict was a spur of the
moment decision by an airline pilot turned prime
minister. Indian politicians
have consistently resisted the formation of an
institution to deal with national
security and the whole politico-diplomatic approach
was based on
assessments by India's non specialist bureaucracy at
the defence and
external Affairs ministries. As an instance, the
Indian consul general in New
York was pitchforked into the role of chief
negotiator with the Tamil Tigers
overnight. Even when the crucial briefing was going
on for the top military
commanders for an impending operation in Sri Lanka,
the single map used
was of 1937 vintage.
The 10,000-strong force landed in Kankesanturai Port
with the expectation
of playing a UN-like peace keeping role under the
terms of the Indo-Sri
Lankan peace accord signed on July 29, 1987, by
Lankan President
Jayawardene and the Indian PM. Indian intervention
was inevitable as the
Sri Lankan offensive in May 1987 saw the genocide of
Tamils. The
destruction of the oldest Tamil library in Jaffna
showed that the Sri Lankans
were intent on wiping out the Tamil culture. The
killing of civilians in Jaffna
produced a flood of refugees and an outcry in Tamil
Nadu. An impending
provincial election in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu
made it a sensitive issue
for the Congress party anxious to retain its support
in the state. The Lankan
government also imposed an economic embargo on the
Jaffna peninsula
leading to great hardship for the people of the area.
It was an accord forced on the Sinhalese by the
Indian might. During the
initial stages there was apprehension that the Sri
Lankan army may oppose
the move. To safeguard the Lankan President against a
military coup, a
battalion of Indian commandos was stationed in
Colombo harbour on board
an Indian naval ship. Contingency plans were made to
fight the Lankan army
should it oppose the landings. The LTTE fully
co-operated with Indian
army.
There was reluctance on the part of the Lankan
government to release
political detenues and pressure was brought on the
LTTE to lay down arms
before the peace process could progress further. Amid
this tension,
Prabhakaran, the LTTE supremo, repudiated the July 29
accord. He,
however, agreed to go along as long as the Lankan
government kept its side
of bargain. In order to surrender weapons, the Indian
high commissioner in
Colombo began building pressure on the LTTE through
the Indian army.
To counter this and also to test the Lankan
government's intent, the LTTE
demanded the release of its cadres languishing in
Lankan jails. Thileepan, the
Tigers' propaganda chief began an indefinite fast on
this issue on September
15. He died on September 25. His death was blamed on
the Indian
government and its policy of appeasing Sri Lanka and
of bringing pressure
on the Tamil Tigers. The local Indian army commander
in Jaffna was close
to the LTTE and appreciated their anxieties over the
peace process. But the
Indian high commissioner in Colombo was full of bluff
and bluster. In the
absence of direct communications between the local
army commander in
Jaffna and Delhi, this diplomat assumed command of
the operations on the
field. He continued to breathe down the army's neck
to expedite the laying
down of the arms by the LTTE. A breach with the LTTE
was now
imminent.
The last straw in this sordid drama was the suicide
of 12 LTTE cadres on
October 3. These LTTE men were captured earlier and
were in the custody
of the Indians. On orders from the Indian high
commissioner they were to be
handed to the Lankan authorities for sure torture and
brutal treatment.
Despite the pleadings of the local military
commander, this was done and
resulted in their mass suicide.
Earlier, the Indian diplomat in Colombo had a stormy
meeting with
Prabhakaran. The meeting turned out to be a clash of
egos between a
career diplomat and a natural leader. The last minute
efforts of the Indian
general in charge of operations and much aware of the
ground realities, were
of no avail in the face of the ignorant obduracy of
the Colombo-based
diplomat.. The LTTE now began reprisal killing of
hostages held by them.
To assess the situation, the Indian army chief
arrived in Sri Lanka and made
an astonishing statement -- that the Indian army will
finish the LTTE in a
week. Indian troops were rushed in civil airlines
from peace time
cantonments. Many of the soldiers had been barely for
months in their
peace-time locations after a hard tour of duty on the
border. They were to
spend their time in fighting in Lanka.
With the offensive against the LTTE, India threw away
the only card it held
to pressurise the Lankans to give concessions to
Tamils. The Sri Lankan
government was the biggest gainer. While the Indian
army battled the LTTE,
there was very little progress on the political
front. But for the naivete in
Delhi and the mishandling at Colombo by the high
commissioner, the break
with the LTTE was entirely avoidable. India did and
continues to pay a
heavy price for that folly, Rajiv Gandhi paid for it
with his life. At the end of
two years of campaign the Indian army lost 600 men
and nearly 2500
wounded.
The diplomat responsible for this blunder continued
to prosper and retired
as a foreign secretary. Ever since the LTTE's
offensive in the Jaffna
peninsula began nearly a fortnight ago, Colombo has
been alive with
rumours. Total censorship imposed make it difficult
to understand at what
stage was the military offensive.
Balance of forces
According to the generally accurate `Military Balance
1994-95', Sri Lanka
has a total force of four divisions with 25 T-55
tanks and around 150
assorted armoured personnel carriers. The air force
has a squadron of F-4
fighters and three squadrons of helicopters. The
artillery component is four
field regiments, ten heavy mortar regiments. The navy
has 43 coastal and 41
inland vessels that are more in the class of fast
patrol boats than ships.
Opposing this force the LTTE has over 4,000 strong
cadres with another
3,000 in support. The LTTE is well equipped with
AK-47 rifles, machine
guns of .50 calibre, plenty of land mines and
improvised mortars that have
ranges up to 1500 m. The anti-aircraft capability of
the LTTE is based on
machine guns and SAM-7 missiles.
Military situation
It is inevitable that memories of the IPKF's
operations to take Jaffna in 1987
are invoked. The Indian army used nearly a whole
division's (10,000
soldiers) strength and suffered very heavy
casualties. India had far greater
resources and its army is also better trained. Sri
Lankan forces now
operating in Jaffna peninsula are possibly not as
strong though it is believed
that some latest equipment has been received from
abroad. The LTTE is
also today far stronger than it was in 1987.
In spite of these factors, it seems that the LTTE is
achieving success at far
lesser cost. The main reason for this is that while
the Indian army fought with
one hand tied behind its back in order to avoid
civilian casualties, the Tamil
Tigers are using the full might of the army, navy and
the airforce.
It must be remembered that but for Indian
intervention, even in May 1987,
the LTTE ruled Jaffna. Thanks to the break between
the LTTE and India
and the bitterness generated by the suspected LTTE
hand in Rajiv Gandhi's
assassination, India is reluctant to intervene.
Options before the Tamil Tigers
In Jaffna the Sri Lankans are on the defensive.
Should it decide to fight a
positional defence it could be isolated and starved
to death. The best that it
can achieve is to inflict such heavy losses that
there is a clamour for a
cease-fire. In conjunction with this attack, the
Tigers can mount terrorist
attacks on Colombo itself in order to divert
attention from Jaffna. An
offensive in the eastern provinces will divert Sri
Lankan forces meant for any
offensive action.
Should the Jaffna attack not succeed, the LTTE has
the option to melt away
into the jungles and carry on a classic guerilla war
just as it did in 1987 when
the Indian army took Jaffna town. But this will mean
a major loss of support
and resources that Jaffna provided the Tigers. The
civil population is also
apprehensive of the Lankan army as unlike its Indian
counterpart, the locals
expect reprisals and harshness. The LTTE is facing a
cruel dilemma, mainly
of its own making, as it cannot expect overt Indian
help.
Long term implications
The Tamil Tigers are not some desperados fighting in
isolation but have the
full moral, material and intellectual backing of the
Sri Lankan Tamil
community numbering over five million. They also have
tacit sympathy, if not
the active support, of sections of the nearly 55
million Tamils in India;
specially when faced with extinction due to the
actions of Sri Lankan armed
forces.
Since the departure of the IPKF, the LTTE had been
virtually running the
government in Jaffna. All the other groups that
claimed to be its rivals have
either merged with it or have been eliminated. The
LTTE in relation to
Tamils in Sri Lanka is today in a position similar to
that acquired by the PLO
in relation to the Palestinian people in the Middle
East. This gives the Tigers
access to the intellectual resources of the Tamils
not only in Jaffna but
worldwide.
Ever since the `Sinhalese only' policy was
implemented by the Sri Lankan
government, over a million Tamils have sought refuge
in the West. The
largest concentration of expatriates is to be found
in Germany, the UK and
Singapore. Most of these are highly skilled
professionals and in the fields of
scientific research, computers and medicine. The
Tamil Tigers have offices in
all these places that carry out the triple role of
propaganda, collection of
donations and also acquisition of technology of
destruction.
An American analyst once mentioned to this author
that he found the Jaffna
Tamils to be the world's most intelligent community.
With such brains and
access to Western technology, it is no wonder that
the Tamil Tigers have
some of the most modern innovative weapons including
biological weapons.
The undisputed and complete sway over Jaffna
peninsula makes it easy for
the LTTE to `persuade' even the reluctant overseas
Tamils to contribute.
The safety of near and dear ones is dependent on this
co-operation. That
the Tigers have shown that they can be quite ruthless
if necessary adds an
element of coercion to the `collections'. There is
also genuine support to the
Tamil militants amongst the Tamils worldwide.
While many Tamils disagree with the means used by the
Tigers and its
fascist outlook, they nevertheless regard them as
saviours of Tamils in the
face of Sinhala chauvinism. This is the greatest
strength of the Tigers and
makes it possible for them to survive. Unless the
LTTE adopts the suicidal
strategy and open confrontation, the Sri Lankan
conflict is likely to continue
for many more years as a low intensity war.
The end of the Cold War has not meant the end of
nationalism and
international conflicts. The Indian Ocean is a unique
area in as much as for
an ocean it has very few littoral countries. As a
consequence, most of its
vast expanse consists of open or international sea.
It is reputed to be very
rich in minerals and in times to come as the
resources on land exhaust, a
race for sea-bed exploitation is a distinct
possibility. The Chinese naval
expansion, proceeding currently at a growth rate of
13 per cent per annum
as well as her attempts to build a base at Coco
Islands belonging to
Myanmar, portend an Indian Ocean rivalry. India can
ill afford to lose
control of this area vital as it is for its security.
Located at the apex of the
Indian Ocean, a friendly Sri Lanka is essential for
Indian defence.
